Poland’s extradition cooperation with Ukraine | In Principle

Following the outbreak of the full-scale war in 2022, Ukraine became the country submitting the most extradition requests to the Polish authorities, overtaking the previous leader, Russia. Now about 50 cases a year reach the regional prosecutors’ offices, where procedures for extradition to Ukraine are initiated pursuant to Interpol Diffusions or Red Notices. The noticeable increase in the number of such cases in the prosecutors’ offices has also led to increased activity in this area by Poland’s regional courts and courts of appeal.

In 2022–2024 alone, according to publicly accessible information, at least 76 such cases were completed in the regional courts, the great majority of which (92%) resulted in a finding that it was legally permissible to turn over the subjects to Ukraine for prosecution or to serve their prison terms. Only four of the cases resulted in a finding that there were barriers to extradition and the subject could not be turned over to the Ukrainian authorities.

In turn, 41 orders were issued by the courts of appeal. In 32 of those cases the courts upheld the order below permitting extradition, and in four cases the extradition order was set aside and the case remanded for rehearing.

During this period, the Polish Minister of Justice also decided to turn over 87 people to Ukraine.

The war’s impact on judicial practice

A key question that arose in 2022 was how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would affect the intensity of Polish/Ukrainian cooperation as well as the decisions by courts evaluating the legal grounds for extradition. Arguments were quickly raised in the courtrooms that there was a threat to fair criminal trials in Ukraine, and that adequate prison conditions could not be guaranteed there. In extreme cases, advocates claimed that due to the ongoing war, the Ukrainian justice system was not functioning at all.

Aware of these problems, the Polish and Ukrainian authorities promptly took efforts to ensure that the cooperation between the countries was not suspended. In April 2022 consultations were held between experts from the two countries’ justice ministries, where the Ukrainians gave assurances that Ukraine would continue to work with Poland (in requests for legal assistance as well as extradition procedures), and that despite the exceptional situation it was possible for Ukraine to receive its extradited citizens in regions not directly affected by the war.

Alongside these actions at the governmental level, in specific extradition proceedings the head of the Ukrainian prosecution service filed highly detailed diplomatic assurances. These included guarantees that criminal proceedings would be conducted in territories away from active military operations, and that subjects would be held at penitentiaries in western Ukraine or other places outside the war zone.

These measures had a significant impact on the decisions taken by the regional courts. During this period, the view came to be widely accepted that the war in Ukraine, in and of itself, was not grounds to refuse extradition (e.g. Zielona Góra Regional Court order of 28 April 2023, case no. II Kop 35/23; Warsaw Court of Appeal order of 24 April 2025, case no. II AKz 316/25).

In 2022–2024 there were three cases finding that extradition was impermissible due to the ongoing military action. In those cases, the courts reasoned that a fair trial could not be guaranteed due to the war, but those cases were decided immediately after the outbreak of war and represent an exception to the general trend (Poznań Court of Appeal order of 24 October 2022, case no. II AKz 561/22; Szczecin Court of Appeal order of 2 October 2024, case no. II AKz 268/24). For the courts allowing extradition, a key argument was that the Ukrainian side had submitted timely information and documents during the extradition proceedings, and actively cooperated with the Polish authorities. That the Ukrainian side quickly responded to requests from the Polish courts demonstrated that the justice system in Ukraine was functioning properly (Kraków Regional Court order of 12 May 2023, case no. III Kop 6/23).

A similar approach, expressing approval for extradition, was taken in cases where the suspects tried to persuade the court that there was a risk of infringement of their rights and freedoms due to the mandatory mobilisation and the possibility of being drafted into the army, and that this was a barrier to extradition. In this respect as well, the courts most often pointed out that the muster applied to all Ukrainian citizens, and because it was not a special situation affecting only the suspect, the suspect’s rights and freedoms would not be infringed (Katowice Court of Appeal order of 12 December 2023, case no. II AKz 1424/23).

Corruption in the Ukrainian justice system

Another issue the Polish courts have analysed is concerns over the integrity of Ukrainian law enforcement authorities and the courts there due to the problem of corruption.

However, the Polish courts have generally held that these concerns are not a barrier to extradition, stressing that the Ukrainian authorities have pursued a number of systemic measures to combat corruption in the justice system. In this area, the regional courts in Poland have pointed out that Ukraine has undergone reforms recently in an effort to become a member of the European Union and to meet the EU’s standards for human rights protection (Warsaw Court of Appeal order of 6 September 2023, case no. II AKz 823/22).

One aspect to be considered is how to assess the threat of corruption to the guarantees of a fair trial posed by the recently publicised introduction of changes vesting Ukraine’s Prosecutor General with oversight of the anticorruption bodies NABU and SAP. This is recognised as a sign of weakening of the battle against corruption, limiting the independence of the anticorruption services (Marcin Jędrasik, “Ukraine: the independence of anti-corruption bodies is being dismantled amid scandals involving top politicians,” Centre for Eastern Studies, 23 July 2025).

But it seems unlikely that this matter will alter the general approach of the Polish courts to their assessment of barriers to extradition. In all likelihood, the courts will continue to reason that these threats and concerns are purely theoretical. The Polish courts will continue to demand evidence from suspects that they, individually, are exposed to the danger of an unfair trial due to corruption in the Ukrainian law enforcement authorities or court system. It should be added that this is extremely hard to prove, particularly when the case does not involve the extradition of politicians, public officials, former police officers, or businesspeople.

Summary

The decisions by the Polish courts in cases seeking extradition to Ukraine in 2022–2024 show that the ongoing war does not constitute an automatic barrier to cooperation in extradition, and this approach will probably not change in the near future. The courts consistently recognise that the submission of diplomatic assurances, and active cooperation from the Ukrainian side, support a finding that the given extradition is legally permissible.

Also unlikely to change is the practice of sweeping grants of extradition requests even though diplomatic assurances—whether provided by Ukraine or by other countries—are practically unverifiable. There is no effective mechanism for monitoring whether, after extradition, these assurances are actually observed in the requesting country. This is a problem not just in Poland, but also in other countries actively cooperating in extradition cases.

Dr Artur Pietryka, adwokat, Business Crime practice, Wardyński & Partners

This article was drafted for the report Extradition in Poland, which is scheduled for publication later this year.